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EUROPEAN EQUITY CARVE-OUTS - GOOD OR EVIL?
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The purpose of this study is to provide a comprehensive analysis of equity carve-outs 
conducted by European companies. Four different angles are discussed: market reaction 
to equity carve-out announcements, motivation behind carve-outs stated by firm 
managers and the business community, financial characteristics of firms conducting 
carve-outs, and operating performance of post-carve-out parent and subsidiary firms. As 
there are no previous equity carve-out studies including a pan-European dataset, this 
study sheds light on the reasons for European companies to conduct equity carve-outs, 
and contributes to the existing discussion about the sources of the wealth gain related to 
them.
DATA
The equity carve-out sample used in this study is obtained from two sources: Security 
Data Company’s (SDC) International Mergers & Acquisitions and Global New Issues 
databases, and Mergers & Acquisitions’ yearly lists of ‘Foreign company carve-outs’. 
The data consists of 94 European carve-outs during the period 1991-2005. A European 
carve-out is here classified as one with a European parent company.
RESULTS
This study finds statistically significant abnormal returns for sample parent companies 
announcing equity carve-outs. The announcement-day excess return equals 1.61 %, and 
the announcement-period -5, +5 days excess return equals 2.31 %. The most commonly 
stated motives for equity carve-outs are refocusing and raising equity capital for debt 
repayment or investing purposes. Parent companies initiating equity carve-outs are more 
leveraged than industry peers before the carve-outs, but their operating performance 
does not differ from rivals.
This study also finds that carved-out subsidiaries’ operating performance improves 
relative to industry peers following the carve-out, measured both by the scale and 
efficiency of operations. Parent companies’ operating performance is worse that rivals’ 
after the carve-out. Overall, the study finds evidence supporting the divestiture gains 
hypothesis of equity carve-outs.
KEYWORDS
Divestment, equity carve-out, event-study, financial characteristic, operating
performance.
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EUROOPPALAISTEN YRITYSTEN TOTEUTTAMAT TYTÄRYRITYSTEN 
LISTAUTUMISANNIT
TUTKIMUKSEN TARKOITUS
Tutkimuksen tarkoituksena on antaa kattava kuva eurooppalaisten yritysten 
toteuttamista tytäryhtiöiden listautumisanneista (equity carve-out). Aihetta tarkastellaan 
neljästä näkökulmasta: markkinoiden reaktio listautumisjulkistuksiin, yritysten ja 
analyytikoiden esiintuomat motiivit listautumisten toteuttamiselle, emoyritysten 
taloudellinen tila ennen listautumisantia sekä emo- ja tytäryritysten operatiivinen 
tuloksentekokyky listautumisannin jälkeen. Koska aihetta ei ole aikaisemmin tutkittu 
useita Euroopan maita kattavalla aineistolla, valaisee tutkimus motiiveja eurooppalaisten 
yritysten järjestämien tytäryritysten listautumisten taustalla, sekä osaltaan selvittää 
julkistuksiin liittyvien ylisuurien tuottojen syitä.
AINEISTO
Tutkimuksessa käytetty aineisto on kerätty kahdesta lähteestä: Security Data Company:n 
(SDC) International Mergers & Acquisitions- ja Global New Issues- tietokannoista, sekä 
Mergers & Acquisitions - lehden vuosittain julkaisemista ’ulkomaalaisten yritysten 
toteuttamat tytäryritysten listautumisannit’ - artikkeleista. Aineisto koostuu 94:stä 
tytäryritysten listautumisannista, jotka julkistettiin välillä 1991-2005.
TULOKSET
Tutkimustulokset osoittavat tilastollisesti merkitseviä ylisuuria tuottoja eurooppalaisille 
yrityksille, jotka julkistavat suunnitelman tytäryrityksensä listautumisannista. 
Julkaisupäivän keskimääräinen ylisuuri tuotto on 1.61 %, ja julkaisuperiodin -5, +5 
päivää keskimääräinen ylisuuri tuotto on 2.31 %. Yleisimmät motiivit listautumisantien 
toteuttamisen taustalla ovat keskittyminen ydinosaamiseen sekä pääoman saaminen joko 
velkojen takaisinmaksua tai investointien rahoittamista varten. Emoyritykset, jotka 
päättävät listata tytäryrityksensä, ovat velkaantuneempia kuin kilpailijansa, mutta niiden 
operatiivinen tuloksentekokyky ei eroa merkittävästi kilpailijoista.
Tutkimus osoittaa myös, että listattujen tytäryritysten operatiivinen tuloksentekokyky 
paranee listautumisen jälkeen, sekä toiminnan mittakaavalla että tehokkuudella mitaten. 
Sen sijaan emoyritysten tuloksentekokyky on huonompaa kuin kilpailijoiden 
listautumisen toteuttamisen jälkeen. Kaiken kaikkiaan, tutkimus löytää näyttöä 
tytäryritysten listautumisiin liittyvän ‘divestiture gains’ - hypoteesin puolesta.
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Starting from the 1980s, companies both in the USA and in Europe have been moving toward 
a greater corporate focus. This is a reverse to strategies of diversification that were 
predominant in earlier decades. Comment and Jarrell (1995) document a steady rise in focus 
and specialization for American companies during the 1980s. In 1988, almost 56 % of 
exchange-listed firms had only one business segment, compared to 38 % in 1979. What is 
perhaps even more important, they show that greater focus is associated with shareholder 
wealth maximization. Comment and Jarrell find the best average stock market performance 
for firms that head toward an increase in focus, whereas the opposite is true for firms 
increasing diversification. Also Berger and Ofek (1995) have found that diversified US firms 
suffered from a value discount of approximately 13 % to 15 % during 1986-1991. In Europe, 
the trend in focus has not been documented as broadly. Boer, Brounen and Op’t Veld (2005) 
study a specific sector, real estate, with a sample consisting of US, British, French, Dutch and 
Swedish listed property companies. They find that European companies exhibit higher levels 
of geographical concentration and lower levels of industrial focus than US companies, but 
there is a trend toward greater industrial focus in European companies as well. Boer et al. also 
find evidence of better stock market performance for more focused firms, and for firms 
shifting their strategy toward corporate specialization.
Firms can achieve greater focus with different types of transactions, including asset sell-offs, 
spin-offs and equity carve-outs. An asset sell-off is the sale of an asset to a corporate buyer, 
without public financial markets. In a sell-off, the seller gives up control of the asset in 
exchange for funds. A spin-off means the separation of a subsidiary from parent firm, in 
which the shares in the new entity are transferred to existing shareholders of the parent. A 
spin-off thus creates an independent, exchange-listed company, with no control left to the 
parent. In an equity carve-out, shares in a subsidiary are offered to the public. It can therefore 
be seen as a subsidiary IPO. Typically, the parent retains a controlling interest in the 
subsidiary. A new, exchange-listed company is created, but the parent still has some control 
over the new entity.
Among the first to study equity carve-outs were Schipper and Smith (1986). They compare 
equity carve-outs with seasoned offers of equity, SEOs, and find a positive abnormal return of 
1.8 % for parents of carved-out subsidiaries compared to a negative abnormal return for
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companies conducting SEOs. They state this difference could be due to a number of things, 
including separation of subsidiary growth opportunities from those of the parent, better 
financial information about the subsidiary as a result of exchange listing, and restructuring of 
management incentive contracts. Since Shipper and Smith, a number of studies have 
documented positive abnormal returns for firms conducting equity carve-outs, mainly with 
US data. These include Allen and McConnell (1998) with a three-day excess return of 2.12 %, 
S lovin, Sushka, and Ferraro (1995) with a two-day excess return of 1.23 %, and Vijh (2002) 
with a three-day excess return of 1.93 %. Some studies including European companies are 
that of Wagner’s (2005), studying German carve-outs, with a three-day excess return of 1.72 
%, and Elsas and Löffrer’s (2003), with an announcement-day return of 1 % also with a 
German sample.
Although the positive abnormal returns associated with equity carve-outs are quite well 
documented, there is no consensus about the sources of this wealth gain. The two main 
competing explanations are 1) the divestiture gains hypothesis, based on Shipper and Smith’s 
work, and 2) the asymmetric information hypothesis, originally developed by Nanda (1991). 
The divestiture gains hypothesis is a broad term for hypotheses all stemming from increased 
efficiency and transparency of operations, better quality of financial information and 
decreased agency costs as a result of separation of a subsidiary form the parent. The 
asymmetric information hypothesis, on the other hand, states that managers use equity carve- 
outs mainly as financing instruments. Whenever they consider a subsidiary’s equity 
overvalued and the parent’s equity undervalued, they are likely to issue equity in the 
subsidiary. Because the parent’s assets are usually considerably larger than those of the 
subsidiary, the parent’s share price rises with the announcement of an equity carve-out.
This paper studies a set of European equity carve-outs conducted over the period 1991 
through 2005. A European carve-out is here classified as one with a European parent 
company. To my knowledge, there is no comprehensive study including pan-European 
companies, perhaps due to limited amount of data available. The purpose of this study 
therefore is to provide a broad analysis of European equity carve-outs; stock market reaction, 
motives for conducting a carve-out, common features of parent companies and effects of 
carve-outs on future performance of both parent and carved-out subsidiary.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses existing studies about equity 
carve-outs and related issues, and their main findings. Section 3 presents my research 
hypotheses derived from previous literature. Section 4 describes the data and research 
methods used, and section 5 presents the results of empirical studies. Section 6 concludes.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
In this section, I present existing literature related to equity carve-outs, spin-offs, asset sell- 
offs and the choice of divestiture method.
2.1. Research on Equity Carve-Outs
Papers studying equity carve-outs with US data are quite numerous. The basic discussion is 
centred on two competing hypotheses explaining the positive stock market reaction 
documented within equity carve-out announcements. The asymmetric information hypothesis 
sees carve-outs as financing instruments taking advantage of subsidiary overvaluation, 
whereas the divestiture gains hypothesis sees logical efficiency improvements behind the 
carve-out decision.
Schipper and Smith (1986) were the first to discover than equity carve-outs are the only form 
of equity financing arrangement associated with a positive stock market reaction. They study 
a set of 76 US equity carve-outs conducted between 1963 and 1983, and find that parent firm 
shareholders earn an excess return of almost two per cent at the announcement of a carve-out. 
This gain is similar to that of spin-off transactions documented earlier by e.g. Hite and Owers 
(1983) and Miles and Rosenfeld (1983). Schipper and Smith (1986) offer multiple 
explanations to this positive stock market reaction that are all related to the creation of a 
separately traded stock and restructuring of management and incentive contracts of the 
subsidiary. However, they do not analyze the gain in more detail. Later, more papers have 
developed this divestiture gains hypothesis further. Allen (1998) examines a special case of 
Thermo Electron Corporation, probably the best-known example of an advanced equity carve- 
out structure to date. Thermo Electron and its subsidiaries have taken public 12 wholly owned 
units in equity carve-outs, following a clear strategy, starting from 1983. Allen finds that both 
Thermo Electron and its carved-outs units have greatly outperformed industry and market 
benchmarks. In addition, the capital expenditures of carved-out subsidiaries increase 
significantly following the carve-out, and Allen concludes that those units had been 
underinvesting as a part of the parent company. Allen presents Thermo Electron as an 
example of a corporation with an innovative corporate governance system and is clearly an 
advocate of the divestiture gains hypothesis of equity carve-outs, at least in this specific case.
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Hulburt, Miles and Woolridge (2002) also find evidence for the divestiture gains hypothesis. 
They study a sample of 185 equity carve-outs during the period 1981-1994, analysing the 
effect of carve-out announcement on parent rivals. The two main competing hypotheses 
would seem to cause a different reaction on parent rivals’ stock prices: if an equity carve-out 
is a signal of undervalued parent firm equity (as implied by the asymmetric information 
hypothesis), and this is extended to the parent’s entire industry, then rival firms’ stock prices 
should react positively. But if an equity carve-out demonstrates efficiency gains for the 
parent, then rival firms’ stock prices should react negatively. Hulburt et al. find evidence of 
the latter, with a mean return on rivals of-0.41 % surrounding the announcement date.
S lovin, Sushka and Ferraro (1995) examine equity carve-outs from a slightly different angle: 
stock price reaction of carved-out subsidiaries’ rivals. They compare rivals’ stock price 
reactions to announcements of equity carve-outs, spin-offs and asset sell-offs. S lovin et al. 
document a negative valuation effect of-1.0 % on rivals of carved-out subsidiaries, whereas 
the reaction is positive in the case of spin-offs and normal for sell-offs. They suggest that 
managers conduct equity carve-outs whenever they think outside investors will price the 
equity favourably relative to its true value. This evidence supports the model of asymmetric 
information originally developed by Nanda (1991). Nanda presents a theoretical model to 
explain when all equity firms will either forgo a positive NPV project, or finance it with a 
SEO or an equity carve-out. His conclusion is that whenever firms announce equity carve- 
outs, it is a negative signal about subsidiary equity (which is overvalued) and a positive signal 
about parent equity (which is undervalued). Because parent assets are usually greater than 
subsidiary assets, market reaction is positive.
More recently, Powers (2003) finds evidence of the asymmetric information hypothesis as 
well. He examines 181 equity carve-outs that occurred between 1981 and 1996 and presents 
three main findings: carved-out subsidiaries’ operating performance peaks at the time of the 
carve-out but declines thereafter, parents sell a greater percentage of shares when subsequent 
performance is poor, and liquidity-constrained parents sell a greater percentage of shares in 
the subsidiary. Powers concludes that managers conduct equity carve-outs not to improve 
efficiency, but to sell overvalued equity.
Allen and McConnell (1998) propose a managerial discretion hypothesis of equity carve-outs. 
They study a sample of 188 equity carve-outs conducted in the US between 1978 and 1993.
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They assume that managers value control over assets and are thus reluctant to sell off or carve 
out subsidiaries even if it would be in the best interest of shareholders. One of Allen and 
McConnell’s pre-assumptions is that equity carve-outs can give rise to a gain to certain firms, 
but they do not investigate the sources of this gain and therefore provide no evidence either on 
the asymmetric information or the divestiture gains hypotheses. Instead, they concentrate on 
financial condition of pre-carve-out firms and find them to be more leveraged and less 
profitable than industry peers. Allen and McConnell see equity carve-outs as asset sales, to 
the public instead of a single buyer, and assume carve-outs are used only when the funds are 
needed for other purposes which are preferred by management. These other purposes usually 
refer to paying down debt or retaining the funds for investments. Allen and McConnell divide 
their sample of carve-outs according to the intended use of funds and observe that the 
difference in excess returns is substantial for the two subsamples. When the funds are used to 
repay creditors or pay a dividend to shareholders, the average excess return is more than 6 %, 
opposite to close to zero returns when the funds are retained within the firm. This implies that 
the market discounts the gains in carve-outs whenever management has discretion over the 
funds generated, due to agency costs of management.
Elsas and Löfffer (2003) adopt a view that resembles that of Allen and McConnell’s (1998). 
They study 46 equity carve-outs conducted in Germany over the period 1984 through 2000, 
and find average announcement-day effect of 1 %, and 4 % for -5,+5 event window . Elsas 
and Löfffer state that the degree of control in pre-carve-out firm affects the magnitude of 
excess returns. The more the management in pre-carve-out firm is subject to control by any 
corporate governance institution, such as controlling shareholders, supervisory boards or 
banks, the lower should be the gain in value from change of control structure associated with 
equity carve-outs. Their empirical findings are consistent with this hypothesis: higher degree 
of pre-event ownership concentration leads to lower excess returns.
Some papers have studied the long-term performance of carve-out subsidiaries’ stock in 
addition to short-term returns. Vijh (1999) uses a sample of 628 US equity carve-outs from 
1981 to 1995 to test whether subsidiary stocks underperform market and industry benchmarks 
as it has been documented with IPOs and SEOs (see Ritter (1991) and Spiess and Affleck- 
Graves (1999) on IPO and SEO underperformance, respectively). His main finding is that 
carve-out subsidiaries do not underperform various benchmarks during the following three 
years. Three-year buy-and-hold excess returns for subsidiaries are insignificantly different
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from zero. Vijh concludes that the superior performance of carved-out firms compared to 
IPOs and SEOs arises because subsidiary and parent firms can concentrate on fewer business 
segments after the carve-out, and because parents usually continue to hold a monitoring stake 
in subsidiaries.
Before Vijh, Klein, Rosenfeld and Beranek (1991) have examined the long-term performance 
of subsidiary stocks and the occurrence of second events after the carve-out. Second events 
are present in all but one case of their 40 equity carve-outs, and mean either re-acquisition of 
subsidiary stock by parent or disposal of stake altogether. Klein et al. find that the combined 
parent stock price reaction to both the initial announcement and the second event depends on 
the nature of the second event: in the case of re-acquisition, the combined return is statically 
insignificant, but in the case of sell-off, it is significantly positive. Subsidiary share price 
reaction is positive in both cases, but this gain is offset by negative abnormal returns in the 
period between the two events. This is in contrast to findings of Vijh (1999), whose results 
might be more reliable because he uses a considerably larger sample of carve-outs.
Long-term returns on subsidiary stock have also been studied in a Me Kinsey review by 
Anslinger, Carey, Fink and Gagnon (1997). They study a set of 119 equity carve-outs 
conducted by US companies during the period from 1985 to 1995. Anslinger et al. find that 
over a three-year period, the carved-out subsidiaries in their sample earned average compound 
annual returns of 20.3 percent, which is 9.6 % better than the Russell 2000 Index that was 
used as a benchmark. The returns were even better for subsidiaries in which stakes were sold 
repeatedly by parents: three years after the carve-out, the subsidiaries earned annual returns of 
36.8 %, again beating benchmarks.
Overall, there exists a considerably large amount of equity carve-out studies with US data. 
Still, there is no unanimity about the sources of the well-documented wealth gain to 
shareholders. There are studies supporting both of the main two hypotheses. Studies with pan- 
European data do not exist (to my knowledge), and therefore it is of interest to see what kind 
of conclusions can be drawn from this study.
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2.2. Research on Spin-Offs
Research on spin-offs is closely related to that on carve-outs, since both are ways to divest a 
subsidiary and can be considered as alternatives to each other. The main difference is that an 
equity carve-out generates cash to parent and/or subsidiary firms, whereas a spin-off means 
pro-rata distribution of shares to existing parent shareholders usually in the form of a tax-free 
dividend. Spin-offs have been in the interest of researchers before carve-outs and there exist 
numerous studies about them.
Hite and Owers (1983) examine stock price reactions around 123 spin-off announcements in 
the US during the period 1963-1981. They find positive abnormal returns of 3.3 % for (-1,0) 
event window and 7.0 % for (-50,0) event window. Hite and Owers study two hypotheses that 
might explain the gain: contracting efficiency, which is close to the divestiture gains 
hypothesis of equity carve-outs, and expropriation from senior claimholders. They find no 
evidence of the latter and conclude that spin-offs create more efficient contracts and 
comparative advantage for parent and subsidiary firms. Hite and Owers also study press 
announcements to explain in more detail the gain to shareholders which seems quite large. 
They find that firms that use spin-offs to facilitate mergers or specialize in operations earn 
larger excess returns than firms that use spin-offs as a response to regulatory or anti-trust 
intervention, when the excess returns are negative.
Simultaneously with Hite and Owers, Schipper and Smith (1983) study voluntary spin-off 
announcements also for the period 1963-1981. Their study includes 93 spin-offs which 
generate excess returns of 2.84 % for (-1,0) announcement-period. According to Schipper and 
Smith, this wealth increase does not come wholly at the expense of bondholders, but may 
arise from tax and regulatory advantages and/or from improved managerial efficiency.
Later, Aron (1991) develops a model which sees corporate spin-offs as a feature of 
managerial incentive contracts in a diversified firm. She argues that even a possibility of 
future spin-off improves the incentives of current division managers, and spin-offs can help a 
multi-segment firm to attract and retain key employees. Spin-off incentive policies can 
outperform traditional principal-agent contracts in diversified firms since after a spin-off, the 
stock value of a division is a much cleaner signal of managerial performance than when it 
belongs to the parent firm.
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Daley, Mehrotra and Sivakumar (1997) test a prediction from corporate focus literature that 
cross-industry spin-offs create more value than own-industry spin-offs. A cross-industry spin­
off is defined as one where parent and subsidiary firms belong to different 2-digit SIC codes. 
They find a mean announcement-period (-1,0) excess return of 3.4 % for their whole sample 
of 85 spin-offs. When the sample is divided into two, 65 cases of cross-industry spin-offs earn 
an excess return of 4.3 %, compared to 1.4 % for remaining 25 cases of own-industry spin­
offs. Daley et al. conclude that spin-offs create value only when they increase corporate focus. 
They attribute this value increase mainly to improvements in parent firm operating 
performance. Daley et al. thus state that spin-offs are a means for companies to remove 
unrelated assets, and help managers to concentrate on core activities which they are best 
suited to manage. Their conclusions are partly in contrast to those of Aron (1991) who sees 
spin-offs as incentive tools especially for division managers.
Cusatis, Miles and Woolridge (1992) examine parent and subsidiary stock performance up to 
three years after the spin-off. Their study includes 146 US spin-offs over the 1965-1988 
period. Cusatis et al. find superior long-term investment performance for both parent and 
spun-off subsidiaries, and their combinations, but only for firms which are associated with 
unusually high post-spin-off restructuring activity. Their spin-off-parent combinations earn a 
2-year excess return of 24.2 % from six months before the distribution date. Cusatis. et al. 
conclude that spin-offs provide a low-cost method of transferring control of corporate assets 
to bidders who will create greater value.
Hypotheses about corporate spin-off are partly similar to those about equity carve-outs. Yet, 
there is no such a clear confrontation between the different hypotheses as with equity carve- 
outs. The confrontation between equity carve-out hypotheses arises from the cash-generating 
nature of the transaction that does not exist in the case of spin-offs. Therefore it may be 
considered a more complicated task to estimate reasons for carve-outs than for spin-offs.
2.3. Research on Sell-Offs
Research on sell-offs is also related to that on carve-outs, since the two are ways to divest a 
subsidiary and both methods (usually) generate cash to parent firms. However, sell-offs do
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not lead to the creation of an independent publicly listed company, and therefore the nature of 
sell-off transactions is considerably different from equity carve-outs’.
Jain (1985) was among the first to study the effects of sell-off announcements on the sellers’ 
and buyers’ stock prices. He examines 1000 voluntary sell-off announcements in the US 
between 1976 and 1978 and finds a significant 5-day excess return of 0.70 % for firms 
announcing asset sales. Buyer of assets also exhibit abnormal performance, although in a 
lesser extent: on day -1, they earn an excess return of 0.35 % but for days -5 to -1 the returns 
are insignificantly different from zero. Jain also finds evidence of poor stock market 
performance for the selling companies before the sell-off announcement, since the 
announcement is preceded by a period of significant negative abnormal returns.
Later, John and Ofek (1995) study a set of 321 asset sales announced during the period 1986 
to 1988 in the US. In addition to studying the market reaction to sell-off announcements, they 
also investigate the motives behind them. John and Ofek find an average three-day excess 
return of 1.5 % for firms announcing divestments of operating units by means of a trade sale. 
Their basic hypothesis is that firms conduct sell-offs in order to increase focus and hence to 
improve their operating performance. John and Ofek find that there is a significant 
improvement in the performance of divesting firms’ remaining assets in the three years 
following the sale, but this is true only for firms increasing focus. They also find that 
increased focus is an important positive determinant of the selling firm’s stock price reaction 
to the announcement of a sell-off.
Lang, Poulsen and Stulz (1995) develop a managerial discretion hypothesis about corporate 
sell-offs that is later extended to cover also equity carve-outs by Allen and McConnell (1998). 
According to Lang et al., management sells firm assets only when it is the cheapest source of 
funding available to pursue its own objectives, instead of selling assets because of efficiency 
improvements. They study a set of 93 US firms announcing voluntary sell-offs during the 
period 1984 through 1989, and find that a typical firm in their sample performs poorly and/or 
has high leverage before the sell-off. Also, share price reaction to sell-offs is positive only 
when the proceeds from the sale are paid out. Lang et al. call their hypothesis about the 
motivation of sell-offs the financing hypothesis of asset sales, which closely resembles the 
financing hypothesis of equity carve-outs introduced later in section 3.
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More recently, Kaiser and Stouraitis (2001) study the effect of the motivation behind a sell- 
off and the use of proceeds from the sale on the value of 289 UK firms divesting assets during 
1984-1994. With their sample of 590 sell-offs, Kaiser and Stouraitis find that sell-offs 
increase firm value when they are conducted to increase focus or to divest loss-making assets. 
When sell-offs are used to raise cash, to reshuffle operations without focusing, or when the 
motivation is not announced, the sell-offs do not lead to a value increase. With respect to the 
use of proceeds, returning the proceeds to shareholders or using them to decrease leverage are 
found to affect firm value positively, whereas using the proceeds for investment purposes had 
a negative impact on firm value during the 1980s, but disappeared in the 1990s. Kaiser and 
Stouraitis analyze news reports to identify reasons behind sell-offs decisions in the same 
manner that I do in this study.
In short, research on sell-off has found significant abnormal returns for firms conducting sell- 
offs, similarly as with equity carve-outs and spin-offs. Motives behind sell-offs and carve-outs 
might be partly the same due to the cash-generating nature of both transactions. Especially the 
financing and managerial discretion hypotheses of sell-offs have been extended to carve-outs 
later on.
2.4. Research on the Choice between Divestiture Methods
In addition to studying the different divestiture methods separately, some papers have also 
analysed the choice between divestiture methods made by companies. The purpose of these 
studies is to see if companies that choose a certain kind of divestment method differ from 
those choosing other forms of divestments.
N
Michaely and Shaw (1995) were the first to compare firms that choose to divest either 
through a spin-off or a carve-out. Their purpose is to analyse if divesting firms differ in any 
systematic manner conditional on the divestiture method chosen, and if so, are there 
differences in the type or quality of assets transferred that would explain that choice. 
Michaely and Shaw also study the operating performance of the divested subsidiaries and the 
parent companies after the divestiture. They use a sample of 91 divestments made in the US 
between 1981 and 1988 and find that riskier, more leveraged, and less profitable firms choose 
to divest through a spin-off. The spin-offs are also smaller and less profitable that their 
carved-out counterparts. Michaely and Shaw suggest that the divestment method choice is
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affected by a firm's access to the capital market, since greater scrutiny and more detailed 
disclosure are required in equity carve-outs than in spin-offs. They do not find evidence of 
management leaving undervalued assets to the hands of existing shareholders, or a firm’s cash 
needs being a major driver behind the divestment method choice. Operating efficiencies are 
not found to affect the choice either. Both the spun-off and carved-out subsidiaries 
underperform the market after the divestment, as well as the spin-off parents, but the carve- 
out parents’ performance is in line with industrial rivals. These results contradict those of 
Hulburt, Miles and Woolridge (2002) who find operating performance improvements for 
equity carve-out parents and subsidiaries.
More recently, Frank and Harden (2001) extend the work of Michaely et al. (1995) on the 
choice between a spin-off and a carve-out. They examine the characteristics of 64 spin-offs 
and 76 carve-outs conducted during the period 1991-1997 in the US. Contrary to Michaely et 
al., Frank and Harden find that cash need is associated with the occurrence of carve-outs. As a 
firm’s cash need increases, so does the likelihood of divestment through a carve-out. 
Additionally, also contrary to Michaely et al., the authors find no evidence of differences in 
the size, leverage or profitability of the parent firms. Frank et al. suggest that the markets’ 
demand for the subsidiary plays a significant role in the choice of divestment method. They 
see carve-outs as an increasing function of the subsidiary industry’s attractiveness and the 
profitability of the subsidiary. Frank et al. also find that the benefits of controlling a 
subsidiary in a related industry are more likely to lead to a carve-out than a spin-off when the 
parent and subsidiary are in related industries, and that the outcome of a tax ruling can also 
alter divestiture plans.
Khan and Mehta (1996) investigate the reasons behind a firm’s choice to divest assets through 
either a sell-off or a spin-off. They study 280 sell-offs and 86 spin-offs for the period 1969- 
1987 with US data. Their results suggest that firms undertake divestitures because of low 
marginal return together with high operating and financial costs of the divested asset. 
According to Khan and Mehta, the form of divestiture is determined by the operating risk of 
the division to be divested. A division with low operating risk (low growth, stable earnings) 
tends to be divested through a sell-off, whereas a high-risk division (high growth prospects 
and uncertainty) tends to be divested through a spin-off.
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There is one Master’s Thesis written on the choice between spin-offs and carve-outs as well. 
Rejman (2004) examines market reactions to carve-out and spin-off announcements and 
analyses the motivation for such divestitures. He uses a global dataset with 93 equity carve- 
outs and 127 spin-offs over the period 1994-2003. Rejman finds statistically significant 
abnormal returns of 1.56 % for a (-5,+5) days interval for his carve-out sample, and 1.70 % 
abnormal returns for spin-offs over the same time interval. Rejman finds some evidence of 
financing and managerial incentives being motives for equity carve-outs. Cross-industry 
carve-outs, marginal tax rate, parent leverage, operating profit margin and return on invested 
capital affect the magnitude of excess returns. According to Rejman, his results support the 
findings of Michaely and Shaw (1995) who argue that bigger, less leveraged and more 
profitable firms choose carve-outs over spin-offs. In Rejman’s sample, parent companies’ 
operating profit margin, return on invested capital and asset turnover decline sharply after the 
carve-out. This indicates that the parent companies might have been in short of cash before 
the carve-out. As for spin-off motives, Rejman states that refocusing and better stand-alone 
value and opportunities are main reasons for companies to conduct spin-offs. In Europe, the 
market seems to prefer tax-free spin-offs in which capital gains taxes are paid only when 
shareholders sell their shares in the spun-off unit.
Rejman’s study is interesting in a sense that it uses a global dataset and therefore includes also 
European companies. However, the majority (44 out of 93) of the equity carve-outs in his 
sample have been conducted by US companies. Rejman’s Thesis includes 23 carve-outs by 
Western European companies. For this sub-sample, Rejman finds a 1.27 % abnormal return 
over the period of (-1,+1) days from the announcement. In addition to financing and 
managerial incentives types of reasons behind carve-outs, Rejman finds some evidence of 
generation of funds for investments being a reason for companies to conduct carve-outs in 
Europe.
Overall, there are some papers that have tried to decipher the reasons behind divestment 
method choice, but there is no unanimity among researchers about the underlying motives. 
Some argue that cash-generating divestments, such as equity carve-outs or asset sales, are 
preferred by cash-constrained firms, whereas others state that it is the firm’s possibility to 
access the capital market that determines the divestment method.
17
3. HYPOTHESES
In this section, I present several hypotheses that will be tested later on related to motivation of 
equity carve-outs. Three different angles are discussed: hypotheses related to stock market 
reaction, hypotheses related to individual firm characteristics, and hypotheses related to firm 
performance after the carve-out.
3.1. Hypotheses Related to Stock Market Reaction to Equity Carve-Outs
In formulating the hypotheses related to stock market reaction to equity carve-outs, I follow 
the model of Vijh (2002). The two main hypotheses are the asymmetric information 
hypothesis and the divestiture gains hypothesis. Furthermore, the divestiture gains hypothesis 
is divided into several sub-hypotheses each somehow related to more efficient operations 
following the carve-out. The hypotheses presented here are competing; therefore all of them 
are not expected to be true.
• Asymmetric information: Managers exploit overvaluation of subsidiary assets. Carve- 
outs are conducted when management believes that subsidiary assets are overvalued 
and non-subsidiary assets are undervalued (or normally valued). Carve-outs are used 
as financing instruments. Because non-subsidiary assets are usually greater than 
subsidiary assets, stock market reaction to carve-out announcements is positive. 
Hypothesis 1: The ratio of non-subsidiary to subsidiary assets (gamma) affects the 
magnitude of excess returns. When gamma is > 1, excess returns are positive. When 
gamma is < 1, excess returns are negative. News reports should mention asymmetric 
information types of reasons.
Divestiture gains:
• Refocusing strategy: Carve-outs are a means of achieving greater focus. As with spin­
offs and asset sales, improved focus leads to higher firm value, decreasing the 
diversification discount.
Hypothesis 2: News reports and press releases should mention refocusing types of 
reasons. Parent firms will be more diversified than on average. Excess returns will be 
higher when parent and subsidiary firms are in different industries.
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• Financing strategy: Raising equity capital is the primary reason for carve-outs. The 
capital is needed to pay down parent (and possibly subsidiary) debt.
Hypothesis 3: News reports and press releases should mention reasons related to 
paying down debt or other financial obligations. Excess return will be higher in such 
cases. Parent firms may raise capital in SEOs later on, but capital expenditures will not 
be higher than average.
• Investment strategy: As with financing strategy, carve-outs are used to raise equity 
capital. The capital is needed to fund new/existing projects of the subsidiary or parent. 
Hypothesis 4: News reports and press releases should mention new/existing 
investments as reasons for carve-out. Excess returns will be higher in such cases. 
Subsidiaries may raise capital in SEOs later on, and their capital expenditures will be 
higher than matching firms.
• Complexity, undervaluation and pure play: The separation of parent and subsidiary 
makes it easier for investors to understand their value. It attracts investors who are 
only interested in the subsidiary’s shares.
Hypothesis 5: News reports and press releases should mention separation and better 
information as reasons for carve-out. Excess returns will be higher in such cases. 
Excess returns will also be higher if parent and subsidiary are in different industries.
• Managerial incentives: Carve-outs help companies to motivate subsidiary managers 
since stock-based compensation becomes easier. This increased motivation leads to 
better results and thus to higher firm value.
Hypothesis 6: News reports and press releases should mention managerial incentives 
types of reasons. Excess returns will be higher in such cases. Subsidiary capital 
expenditures will be higher than matching firms.
3.2. Hypotheses Related to Company Characteristics
In addition to studying stock market reaction to equity carve-outs and announced motives 
related to them, it is of interest to study the characteristics of firms that conduct carve-outs. If 
some common features are found, this may help to understand the motives behind carve-outs 
other than stated by the companies. Allen and McConnell (1998) analyse operating 
performance of firms conducting equity carve-outs, and provide evidence of high leverage 
and poor operating performance before the carve-out. Similarly, Powers (2003) finds parent
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firms to be more leveraged and underperform their matching samples in the fiscal year of the 
carve-out. Allen and McConnell present managerial discretion as a reason for carve-outs: 
managers prefer control over assets and conduct carve-outs only when necessary. They do not 
present evidence about the sources of wealth gain per se, but their results may be seen as 
supporting the financing hypothesis since excess returns are of greater magnitude when 
proceeds are used to pay down debt.
Two hypotheses related to the financial characteristics of firms conducting equity carve-outs 
can be formulated based on the discussion above:
• Hypothesis 7: Firms that conduct equity carve-outs are more leveraged than on 
average.
Testable implications: Sample parent firms have higher leverage ratios (total debt to 
assets, total debt to common equity) and lower interest coverage ratios (fixed charges 
coverage, EBIT/interest expense) than benchmark firms.
• Hypothesis 8: Firms that conduct carve-outs exhibit poor operating performance 
before the carve-out.
Testable implications: Sample parent firms have lower profit ratios (net margin, gross 
profit margin) than benchmark firms.
3.3. Hypotheses Related to post-Carve-Out Performance
If an equity carve-out produces more competitive parent and subsidiary firms, as suggested by 
the divestiture gains hypotheses, then their operating performance should improve after the 
carve-out. If equity carve-outs are merely financing instruments, then they should not affect 
the operating performance of either the parent or subsidiary. Two measures of improved 
performance are discussed here, as in Hulburt, Miles and Woolridge (2002): scale of 
operations and efficiency of operations. Two hypotheses can be formulated, following 
Hulburt et al.
• Hypothesis 9: Both parent and carved-out subsidiary firms have higher growth rates 
than rivals after the carve-out.
Testable implications: Parent, and especially subsidiary firms have higher sales, 
income, total assets and capital expenditure growth rates than benchmark firms.
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• Hypothesis 10: Both parent and carved-out subsidiary firms are more efficient and 
profitable than rivals after the carve-out.
Testable implications: Parent and subsidiary firms have higher return on assets 
(ROA), return on equity (ROE) and return on invested capital (ROIC) growth rates 
than benchmark firms.
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4. DATA DESCRIPTION AND RESEARCH METHODS
In this section, I present the data and research methods used in this study.
4.1. Data
The sample of equity carve-outs used in this study is obtained from two sources. First, I 
search Security Data Company’s (SDC) International Mergers & Acquisitions and Global 
New Issues databases for equity carve-outs. From the International Mergers & Acquisitions 
database, equity carve-outs with a European parent company are chosen. In the-Global New 
Issues database, equity carve-outs and spin-offs are both listed under the name of ‘Spin-off 
types of transactions’. I thus check each case to see whether it is a spin-off or a carve-out. 
This analysis yields 81 equity carve-outs, one of which involves two subsidiaries carved-out 
by one parent. Second, I go through Mergers & Acquisitions’ yearly lists of ‘Foreign 
company carve-outs’ for issues 1992 through 1999. These represent equity carve-outs by 
European companies conducted in the US. This yields 21 equity carve-outs. In total, I am able 
to identify 102 equity carve-outs. Out of these, 8 carve-outs are eliminated because no stock 
return data is available for them in Thomson One Banker or Datastream databases. My final 
sample size is therefore 94 carve-outs.
I also require a news report/press release/prospectus for each transaction to make sure it is 
really an equity carve-out and to verify the announcement date. The news reports are obtained 
from LexisNexis database using a keyword search. The news reports are also used in the 
empirical analysis of the motivation for carve-outs.
The daily stock returns of each parent firm for stock market reaction analysis are obtained 
from Thomson One Banker - Analytics database. Returns on indices used in this same 
analysis are obtained from Datastream Global Equity Indices database. Financial statement 
information for analyses of pre- and post-carve-out financial condition and operating 
performance are obtained from Worldscope database. Both the Datastream and Worldscope 
databases are accessible through Thomson One Banker.
Some descriptive statistics about the equity carve-outs sample are found from tables 1 to 3. 
Table 1 presents the distribution of total 94 carve-out announcements by year. Table 2 shows
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average and median values for deals, fraction of shares sold by parent, and total deal value, 
again classified by year. Table 3 presents the distribution of carve-outs according to parent 
company nation.
Table 1





















It can be seen from table 1 than the number of equity carve-out has varied during the years. 
Equity carve-outs started to gain popularity in Europe in the beginning of the 1990s, and there 
seems to be a first peak in the number of carve-outs in 1993, when 15 carve-outs were 
announced. After that, the number declined, reaching another peak of 14 carve-outs per year 
during 1999-2000. That was a time of general stock market hype in Europe, which is reflected 
also in the number of equity carve-outs. Since then, there have been equity carve-outs by 
European companies every year, but no such surge has been seen.
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Table 2
This table shows descriptive statistics for 94 equity carve-outs over 1991-2005. Statistics are the 
average dollar amount raised in the offering, the average percentage of shares sold at the offering and 




Average fraction of shares 
sold at the offering
Total deal value 
($ mil)
1991 95,00 37,0 % 95,00
1992 198,26 85,0 % 594,78
1993 165,44 68,0 % 2481,54
1994 247,69 67,1 % 1238,45
1995 468,65 67,7 % 2343,24
1996 449,11 62,7 % 2245,55
1997 434,37 45,4 % 2171,83
1998 401,51 43,2 % 2810,60
1999 845,76 35,1 % 11840,65
2000 684,30 30,6 % 9580,20
2001 3067,06 67,5 % 9201,19
2002 899,85 34,9 % 3599,40
2003 1577,80 71,8 % 3155,61
2004 528,95 56,7 % 3702,67
2005 259,90 CO 00 о % 519,80
Table 2 shows average deal value of equity carve-outs per year, average fraction of shares 
sold at the offering, and total deal value per year. It seems that over the years, parent 
companies have diminished the percentage in subsidiary offered to the public. During the first 
half of the 1990s it was more common to sell of all of the shares in the subsidiary, but later on 
it became more popular to leave the majority of the subsidiary to the control of the parent. 
Total deal value has increased and was greatest during the period 1999 through 2001, but has 
lowered since then. Average deal value has increased quite steadily, also reaching a peak at 
the turn of the century.
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Table 3






Belgium 1 1.1 %
Denmark 1 1.1 %
Finland 4 4.3 %
France 11 11.7 %
Germany 18 19.1 %
Greece 1 1.1 %
Italy 6 6.4 %
Netherlands 1 1.1 %
Norway 1 1.1 %
Spain 7 7.4 %
Sweden 9 9.6 %
Switzerland 10 10.6%
United Kingdom 24 25.5 %
Total 94 100%
From table 3 it can be seen that a fourth of all equity carve-outs in this sample have been 
conducted by UK companies. German companies have been almost as active (19 %), 
followed by French and Swiss companies (12 % and 11 %, respectively). Also the number of 
Swedish companies conducting carve-outs is quite high (9 %). In Belgium, Denmark, Greece, 
Netherlands and Norway only one carve-out was announced during the years.
4.2. Research Methods
4.2.1. Market Reaction to Equity Carve-out Announcement
To study the market reaction to announcement of equity carve-outs, I use the widely known 
event-study methodology. It is commonly used in equity carve-outs studies; see for example 
Allen and McConnell (1998). More specifically, to measure excess returns, I use the market 
adjusted model in which daily stock returns are compared to market returns. The market 
adjusted model has been shown to produce almost identical results as the market model 
(Brown & Warner 1985). The excess returns can be expressed as the following:
e,t= Ru — E(Rit) ( 1 )
where £¡t, R» and E(R„) are excess, actual and expected return to security i on day t. The 
expected return may be expressed as the following:
E(Rlt) = E(Rmt) (2)
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where Rmt is the market return on day t. Thus, the excess return to security i on day t is:
£¡t— Rit E(Rmt) (3)
Since the companies in this sample are from several different European nations, the 'market’ 
here is used to describe each firms’ home country’s main stock index. The indices used in this 
study are the following:
Belgium: Bel 20 
Denmark: OMX Copenhagen 20 
Finland: OMX Helsinki Cap 
France: CAC 40 
Germany: DAX 30 
Greece: DS Greece Market 
Italy: Milan MIB 30 
Netherlands: AEX Index 
Norway: DS Norway Market 
Spain: IBEX 35 
Sweden: OMX Stockholm 30 
Switzerland: Swiss Performance 
United Kingdom: FTSE 100
4.2.2. The Effect of Gamma
To test the two general competing hypotheses about equity carve-outs, the asymmetric 
information and the divestiture gains hypothesis, I calculate gamma which is defined as the 
ratio of non-subsidiary assets to subsidiary assets in the pre-carve-out firm. In Nanda’s (1991) 
theoretical model, the values of non-subsidiary and subsidiary assets are market values before 
the carve-out, which are not observable in reality. Therefore, I use the market values on the 
listing date, as in Vijh (2002). I calculate two measures of gamma: gamma 1, which is the 
ratio of non-subsidiary equity to subsidiary equity, and gamma 2, which is the ratio of non­
subsidiary total assets to subsidiary total assets. I obtain the value of subsidiary equity in the 
pre-carve-out firm by subtracting the newly issued primary shares from all outstanding shares 
on the listing date and multiplying that by the share price. For gamma 2 calculation, I add the 
book value of other assets. To get the value of non-subsidiary equity in the pre-carve-out firm, 
I subtract the value of subsidiary equity from the parent company’s equity value on the listing
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date. Similarly, I subtract the subsidiary total assets from the parent total assets to get the 
value of pre-carve-out non-subsidiary total assets. I obtain the data on total shares issued, 
primary versus secondary shares issued, and total shares outstanding after the offering from 
SDC’s International Mergers & Acquisitions and Global New Issues databases, Thomson One 
Baker’s Analytics database, and finally from company prospectuses. The share price data is 
obtained from Thomson One Banker Analytics and Datastream databases.
4.2.3. Analysis of News Reports
To study the motivation of equity carve-outs stated by sample companies and analysts I 
search for relevant news reports and press releases to identify reasons behind them. I use a 
keyword search in LexisNexis to obtain these news reports. I am able to find a meaningful 
news report for 82 sample carve-outs. Some news reports mention only one reason and others 
many. The different reasons stated are classified according to hypotheses presented earlier in 
section 3, and their effects on the observed abnormal returns are also studied.
4.2.4 Financial Characteristics of Parent and Subsidiary Companies
To examine if there are common financial characteristics in firms that conduct carve-outs, I 
calculate several measures of leverage and operating performance of the sample pre-carve-out 
parent companies. The measures used are fixed charges coverage, debt/total assets, 
debt/common equity, EBlT/interest expense, net margin, and gross profit margin. These 
values are then compared to those of rival companies. Rival companies are defined as 
companies having the same SIC code as the parent. Finally, to test if equity carve-outs result 
in better operating performance of companies involved, I calculate different growth and 
profitability rates for both the parent and subsidiary companies after the carve-out. The 
measures used are sales, income, total assets and capital expenditure growth, and the change 
in return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and return on invested capital (ROIC). 
These are again compared to those of industry rival firms with same SIC codes as parent and 
subsidiary firms. The accounting variables and ratios, and peer group companies are obtained 
from Thomson One Banker’s Analytics database.
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4.2.5. Regression Analysis
To test further the significance of certain parent and subsidiary company features and carve- 
out motives on the magnitude of excess returns I conduct a regression analysis. The following 
cross-sectional statistical model is employed:
CARann i= a + ßiGAMMAi + ß3 INDUSTRY; + ß3INVESTINGi + 
ß4FINANCINGi + ßsLEVERAGE; + ß6ROAi + p, (4)
where the dependent variable CARann ¡ is the abnormal return on security i at the 
announcement of a carve-out, and the independent variables are:
GAMMA = The ratio of non-subsidiary equity to subsidiary equity (gamma I) 
INDUSTRY = A dummy taking the value 1 if the parent and subsidiary have a 
different 2-digit SIC-code, and 0 if not
INVESTING = A dummy taking the value 1 if investing-hypothesis types of
reasons are mentioned in the news reports, and 0 otherwise
FINANCING = A dummy taking the value 1 if financing-hypothesis types of
reasons are mentioned in the news reports, and 0 otherwise
LEVERAGE = The ratio of debt/total assets of the pre-carve-out parent firm
ROA = Return on assets of the parent firm in the year of the carve-out.
The explanatory variables have been chosen based on previous research. For example Vijh 
(2002) uses in his regression analysis the following explanatory variables: decile rank of 
subsidiary market value relative to parent market value, same-industry dummy, financing 
hypothesis dummy, investment hypothesis dummy, complexity, undervaluation and pure play 
dummy, primary vs. secondary shares dummy (taking the value 1 if both primary and 
secondary shares are issued, 0 otherwise) and spin-off dummy (taking the value 1 if the 
carve-out is followed by a spin-off, 0 otherwise). Allen and McConnell (1998) use the 
following independent variables: a dummy to indicate whether the funds are paid out (1) or 
not (0), pre-carve-out firm’s long term debt ratio, pre-carve-out firm’s ROA, a relative size 
measure, the fraction of shares retained by the parent after the carve-out, the fraction of funds 
raised that goes to the parent, second-event dummy and same-industry dummy.
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section I present the results of empirical tests. First, I will report the basic results of the 
event-study analysis, second, the results related to the calculation of gamma, thereafter, the 
results of financial analysis of pre-carve-out parent firms and finally, the results of post-carve- 
out parent and subsidiary performance analysis.
5.1. Event-Study Analysis
The basic results of my event study analysis are presented in table 4. Total number of sample 
firms is 94. The announcement-day excess return equals 1.61 % (t-value 3.43), announcement 
period (-1,1) excess return equals 1.60 % (t-value 2.02), and announcement-period (-5,5) 
excess return equals 2.31 % (t-value 2.04). These results are in line with those obtained in 
previous equity carve-out studies. The magnitude of excess returns in US studies has usually 
been between 1 % and 2 %. In Europe, Wagner (2005) finds announcement period excess 
return of 1.74 % for German companies, and Elsas and Löfffer (2003) announcement-day 
return of 1 % also with a German sample. Rejman (2004) in his Master’s Thesis finds a 1.27 
% abnormal return for European equity carve-outs over a three-day interval.
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Table 4
This table presents the mean cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the equity carve-out sample of 
94 parent firms over 1991-2005. Anndate is the announcement date of the carve-out, anndate + 1 is the 
CAR from one day before the announcement date to one day after the announcement date, and anndate 
± 5 is the CAR from five days before the announcement to five days after the announcement. T-values 
are in the column next to the mean value.
Number of firms 94
Cumulative Abnormal Returns Average t-value
Anndate 1.61%** 3.43
Anndate ± 3 1.60%* 2.02
Anndate + 5 2.31%* 2.04
* and ** denote significance at 5 % and 1 % level, respectively
All of the excess returns documented in table 4 are statistically significant. It seems that 
European companies conducting equity carve-outs achieve a wealth gain similar to that of US 
companies. Figure 1 shows cumulative excess returns for the period (-15,15) days for the 94 
sample parent companies. It can be seen that the excess returns start to accumulate 
approximately 10 days before the announcement, which implies that the market may 
anticipate it. There is a clear jump just around the announcement though, as manifested by the 
1.64 % announcement period (-1,1) days excess return.
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Figure 1
This figure presents the cumulative abnormal returns from announcement date -15 days to 




days from announcement (announcement date= 0)
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Table 5 presents the abnormal returns on a daily basis from -15 days to +15 days from the 
announcement. The announcement-day abnormal return of 1.61 % is preceded by a 0.16 % 
gain on the day -1, but followed by an equal -0.16 % loss on the day +1. The second biggest 
gain is in day +2, 0.56 %. Otherwise, there are no large positive or negative daily returns in 
addition to the announcement day.
Table 5
This table presents the abnormal return per day for a period of (-15, +15) days from the announcement 




































5.2. The Relationship between Gamma and Abnormal Returns
The purpose of calculating Nanda’s (1991) gamma is to see whether companies with a greater 
percentage of non-subsidiary assets before the carve-out exhibit abnormal returns of larger 
magnitude within the announcement of the carve-out, compared to those with a greater 
percentage of subsidiary assets. In Nanda’s view, equity carve-outs are a signal of 
undervalued subsidiary and overvalued parent equity. Therefore carve-outs are positive news 
for owners of companies with greater percentage of non-subsidiary assets. According to 
Nanda’s model, when gamma > 1, the abnormal return should be positive, and when gamma < 
1, the abnormal returns should be negative. I have calculated two measures of gammas for my 
sample companies, but as subsidiary equity/assets are greater that parent equity/assets in only 
a few cases, it is not meaningful to test the differences in excess returns between them. I will 
use gammas in regression analysis though, to see if the magnitude of gamma affects excess 
returns. Table 6 shows some descriptive statistics about the gammas I have calculated. As it 
can be seen from table 6, the variation range of gammas is quite large. If the extreme values 
are excluded, it seems as non-subsidiary assets are some 8 times bigger that subsidiary assets 
in a typical equity carve-out firm of this study. Gamma 1 is the ratio of non-subsidiary equity 
to subsidiary equity, and gamma 2 is the ratio of non-subsidiary assets to subsidiary assets.
Table 6
This table shows descriptive statistics about gammas: average, median, maximum and minimum 
values. Definitions of gamma 1 and gamma 2 are found below the table.





No of observations 74 82
Gamma 1 = Non-subsidiary equity/subsidiary equity 
Gamma 2 = Non-subsidiary assets/subsidiary assets
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5.3. Analysis of Press Releases and News Reports
I have gone through relevant press releases and news reports related to equity carve-out 
announcements to see what kind of motives for carve-outs are stated by the companies or 
business community. I was able to find a relevant news excerpt for 82 cases out of my total 
sample of 94 carve-outs. Their average announcement-day excess return equals 1.46 (t-value 
3.10), which is 0.16 % lower than for the whole sample. Table 7 summarises the results of 
this analysis. The total number of reasons stated is 117 since for some companies several 
reasons are presented. There is evidence on the asymmetric information hypothesis only for 
10 firms. The vast majority of explanations belong to the divestiture gains category (94 
firms). The percentages in table 7 do not add to 100 % due to multiple reasons for some 
sample companies.
Table 7
This table presents a summary of stated motives for public offerings of subsidiary stock for 82 parent 
companies announced between 1991 and 2005. The statements are taken from press releases and news 
reports.
% of sample
Number of firms firms
Asymmetric information:
Undervaluation of non-subsidiary - -
Overvaluation of subsidiary 10 12.2 %
Divestiture gains:
Refocusing 20 24.4 %
Financing 27 32.9 %
Investments 30 36.6 %
Complexity 14 17.1 %
Managerial incentives 3 3.7 %
Other 13 15.9%
5.3.1. Evidence on the Asymmetric Information Hypothesis
I find evidence of asymmetric information only in 10 (12.2 %) of the 82 sample carve-outs 
with relevant news reports. There is no evidence of undervalued non-subsidiary assets; all 
news reports related to asymmetric information mention possible overvaluation of subsidiary 
equity. Two types of possible overvaluation occur: industry overvaluation (5 cases) and 
individual company overvaluation (5 cases). An example of the former is an analyst comment 
on Zurich Insurance Co.’s flotation of Zurich Reinsurance Centre Holdings Inc: “(Zurich 
Insurance) couldn’t pick a better time to put an initial public offering of 8.55 million shares of
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common stock on the market”. Kirk Roeser, president of the reinsurance broker Gill and 
Roeser, continues: "Going into the market now is a very good move" because of the 
perception by investors that "with all the problems reinsurance companies suffered in the past 
year, it is now time to make money," he said.
The case of Dixons Group, floating its Internet portal Freeserve, proves an example of 
individual company overvaluation. A news report on New Media Investor comments 
Freeserve’s IPO as the following: “...Given that this valuation will see Freeserve trading on 
hundreds of times its annual sales, the fact that AOL itself is valued at about 26 times its 
annual sales should give pause for thought...There seems very little doubt that the flotation 
will prove a success—at least for Dixons.” Also an example of individual company 
overvaluation is Prudential PLC’s flotation of Egg, an Internet bank. The following comments 
are from Daily Deal. “Bank analysts are puzzled about the high valuation expected for 
Britain's first Internet bank IPO, given the weakness of traditional bank shares.” “I don't know 
how people are coming up with these £ 1.5 billion ($2.3 billion) to £ 4 billion figures, said 
Mark Phin, an analyst at Williams de Broe in London, referring to Egg's expected market 
capitalization.”
I have calculated excess returns for the companies for which asymmetric information is 
mentioned. Table 8 presents these results, compared with excess returns for companies with 
no asymmetric information reasons mentioned. The numbers are averages, and t-values are in 
parentheses below. The average announcement-day excess return for asymmetric information 
companies is 1.08 % (t-value 1.68), announcement day + 1 days excess return is 0.95 % 
(1.09), and announcement-day ± 5 days excess return is 2.99 % (1.84). The difference to the 
rest of the sample is -0.39 %, -0.08 % and 1.38 %, respectively. Thus, companies with 
asymmetric information reasons earn smaller excess returns over the short interval (-1,1) days 
than companies without asymmetric information. The numbers are not statistically significant, 
though, probably due to small sample size.
Overall, asymmetric information does not seem to be a big concern when it comes to 
European equity carve-outs, despite a few exceptions. When asymmetric information is 
present, excess returns are smaller than when it is not present for the short time interval of 
three days around the announcement.
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Table 8
This table presents average excess returns for companies with asymmetric information types of 
reasons mentioned in news reports (10 cases), compared with the rest of the sample (72 cases). T- 
values are in parentheses below.
Anndate Anndate + 1 Anndate + 5














Difference -0.39 % -0.08 % 1.38%
* and ** denote significance at 5 % and 1 % level, respectively
5.3.2 Evidence on the Refocusing Hypothesis
Refocusing as a motive for carve-outs is mentioned for 20 sample companies (24.4 % of all). 
It is the 3rd common motive stated, behind investments and financing motives. Refocusing as 
a motive for carve-outs is in line with the documented tendency of companies getting back to 
their core business and divesting non-core activities. An example of this is Cattle’s Holdings’ 
flotation of its textile retailer subsidiary Rosebys, which is commented in Eternal Examiner as 
follows: “The proposed flotation of Rosebys also forms a part of Cattle’s strategy to focus its 
activities in the financial services sector”. Another example of refocusing is Adia SA’s IPO of 
Personnel Group of America, its US subsidiary. The following comments are from Business 
Wire. “Adia decided to proceed with the offering in order to increase its focus in the United 
States on its global Adia brand. — Adia has also determined that the shift away from 
supplemental staffing in hospitals towards home health care in the United States means that 
its health care operations are no longer a core business.”
I have calculated excess returns for companies for which refocusing is mentioned as a reason 
for carve-out, compared with the rest of the sample. Table 9 summarizes these results. The 
numbers are averages, and t-values are in parentheses. Companies with refocusing mentioned 
earn an announcement-day excess return of 1.17 % (t-value 1.45), announcement-period (-
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1,1) excess return of 0.68 % (0.58), and announcement-period (-5,5) excess return of 1.76 % 
(0.86). The excess returns for companies with no refocus mentioned are 1.50 % (t-value 2.61), 
1.14 % (1.37) and 1.78 % (1.30), respectively. Companies with refocusing reasons mentioned 
thus seem to earn slightly lower excess returns than the rest of the sample. Maybe refocusing 
is such an evident part of equity carve-outs that stating it out loud does not cause any increase 
in value for parent companies; rather, the value increase in less than average. Most of the 
numbers are again not statistically significant again probably due to small sample size.
Table 9
This table presents average excess returns for companies with refocusing types of reasons mentioned 
in news reports (20 cases), compared with the rest of the sample (62 cases). T-values are in 
parentheses below.
Anndate Anndate + 1 Anndate + 5
Firms for which refocusing 1.17 % 0.68 % 1.76%
is mentioned (145) (0.58) (0.86)
Others 1.50 %* 1.14 % 1.78 %
(2.61) (1.37) (130)
Difference -0.34 % -0.46 % -0.02 %
* and ** denote significance at 5 % and 1 % level, respectively
5.3.3. Evidence on the Financing Hypothesis
Financing as a motive for carve-out occurs frequently. It is mentioned for 27 sample 
companies (32.9 %), and it is the second common reason behind only investment motives. 
Financing reasons include repayment of debt, building of working capital, financing of 
existent operations and general corporate purposes. Statements referring to debt repayment 
are the most common. An example of debt repayment by subsidiary is Pittencrieff Group’s 
flotation of its mobile communications subsidiary Pittencrieff Communications (PCI), that 
Eternal Examines comments as follows: “PCI will repay 18.6 min dlrs of inter-company 
indebtedness to the Pittencrieff Group from the net proceeds of the IPO.” An example of debt 
repayment by parent company is Deutsche Post’s flotation of Deutsche Postbank. According
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to Daily Deal, “Deutsche Post, the former monopoly post office which is still 63% held by 
Germany, said it would use the funds to pay down its €4.75 billion in debt...”
Spectra-Physics AB’s IPO of Spectra-Physics Lasers is an example of financing motives 
related to working capital and general purposes. An article in Business Wire comments that 
“Spectra-Physics Lasers anticipates using the proceeds of the offering for general corporate 
purposes, including working capital and capital expenditures.” Escada’s flotation of St John 
Knits proves an example of financing existing operations. Financial Times article says “The 
fashion company plans to use the proceeds of more than DM 100m (Dollars 61.7m), to offset 
losses in the 1991-1992 year.”
5.3.4. Evidence on the Investing Hypothesis
Funding for investments is the most commonly stated reason for equity carve-outs found in 
this study. It is mentioned for 30 firms (36.6 %). Investments by parent and/or subsidiary both 
occur. Fiat SpA’s decision to float New Holland, its construction equipment subsidiary, gives 
an example of parent company investment. Financial Times comments “...the main reason 
for renewing the credit line and divesting part of New Holland is to raise money for further 
expansion in Italy and abroad” The case of Bure Equity AB, which floated its information 
technology subsidiary Dimension AB, proves an example of raising capital for subsidiary’s 
investments. The following comments are from Daily Deal: “The Sweden-focused firm is 
listing to raise capital for growth into new geographical markets through organic expansion 
and acquisitions...”
Overall, there seems to be strong evidence in favour of the divestiture gains hypothesis, 
mainly the financing and investing sub-hypotheses. Evidence supporting the asymmetric 
information hypothesis is weak. Based on this news reports analysis, majority of firms seem 
to use equity carve-outs to raise equity capital for debt repayment (or other financial 
obligations) or for funding investments.
Since financing and investing hypothesis both see that the primary reason for equity carve- 
outs is raising equity capital, I group companies with those reasons mentioned together (48 
companies) to calculate excess returns, compared with the rest (34 companies). The results of 
this analysis are presented in table 10. Firms for which financing or investing is mentioned as
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a reason for carve-out earn an average excess return of 1.34 % on the announcement date (t- 
value 1.88), announcement-period (-1,1) excess return of 0.99 % (t-value 0.98), and 
announcement-period (-5,5) excess return of 0.94 % (t-value 0.60). The returns for the rest of 
the sample are 1.54 %, 1.08 % and 2.96 %, respectively. Most of the numbers are not 
statistically significant, but financing and investing companies seems to earn on average 
smaller excess returns than the rest of the companies. Thus, the most commonly stated 
reasons for equity carve-outs do not seem to be perceived more favourably by investors that 
other reasons.
Table 10
This table presents average excess returns for companies with financing or investing reasons 
mentioned in news reports (48 cases), compared with the rest of the sample (34 cases). T-values are in 
parentheses below.
Anndate Anndate + 1 Anndate + 5
Firms for which financing or 1.34 % 0.99 % 0.94 %
investing is mentioned (1.88) (0.98) (0.60)
Others 1.54 %* 1.08 % 2.96 %
(2.70) (1.25) (1.77)
Difference -0.21 % -0.09 % -2.03 %
* and ** denote significance at 5 % and 1 % level, respectively
5.3.5. Evidence on the Remaining Divestiture Gains Hypotheses
The two remaining sub-hypotheses of divestiture gains: complexity, undervaluation and pure 
play, and managerial incentives, are mentioned in 17 cases (20.8 %) altogether. The majority 
of this relates to complexity (14 firms); managerial incentives are mentioned only in 3 cases. 
An example of complexity is Tacabalera’s flotation of Logista, its distribution subsidiary, 
which is commented by an analyst in AFX News as the following: "Firstly, it gives greater 
transparency and more specific value to the company's distribution business, and, secondly — 
it would access the capital markets through a business which is less risky than tobacco 
production, always subject to (government) regulations and price fluctuations."
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One of the rare managerial incentives cases is Telefonica SA’s IPO of Terra Networks. The 
following comment is from AFX News: “(Telefonica) has extended its special incentive 
payment scheme for management to its Terra Networks unit, the financial daily Cinco Dias 
reported. It cited the prospectus for the IPO of up to 23.6 pet of Terra Networks, 
book-building for which begins tomorrow.”
5.3.6. Other Reasons for Equity Carve-Outs
For 13 firms, other reasons than those presented in hypotheses 1-6 are mentioned. These 
include government regulations (usually related to privatisations), realization of investments, 
dividend increase and sector recovery from recession.
The results of this news reports analysis are in line with those of Vijh (2002), who finds 
strong evidence in favour of the divestiture gains hypothesis with US data. In his news reports 
analysis, he finds evidence of asymmetric information in only 8 % of the cases. Financing 
strategy is the most common reason in his study, before refocusing and investments. 
Compared to US firms, European firms according to this study seem to use equity carve-outs 
proportionally more to funding new investments than to refocus. This is consistent with the 
notion that trend in focus has been more broadly documented in the US: perhaps European 
companies are still more diversified their US counterparts.
5.4. Leverage and Operating Performance of pre-Carve-Out Firms
I have calculated different measures of leverage and operating performance for the sample 
parent firms and compared those to an industry peer group. The results of this analysis are 
presented in table 11. The statistics are fixed charges coverage, debt/total assets, 
debt/common equity, EBIT/interest expense, net margin, and gross profit margin. ‘Peer 
group’ is defined as a group of 1 to 5 companies with the same SIC code as the parent 
companies, and whose sales are within 5 (or 10, if not enough peer data available) companies 
above or below the parent. Peer group companies are obtained from Thomson One Banker. I 
have left out banks and insurance companies due to different balance sheet structure. For 
some companies, there was not enough peer group data available to calculate the different 




This table presents financial and operating characteristics of parent firms initiating equity carve-outs 
and industry peers over 1991-2005. The first row shows the mean and the second row the median 
value, and the third row shows the standard deviation. T-values for difference are in parentheses. 
Definitions of ratios are found below the table. Industry peers are a group of 1 to 5 companies with the 







Fixed Charges Coverage Average 10.18 9.17 72
Median 3.04 5.30
St. deviation 36.99 16.57
T-value for difference Average (0.23)
Median (0.52)
Debt/total assets, % Average 30.23 27.35 72
Median 33.06 24.37
St. deviation 15.70 14.29
T-value for difference Average (1.55)
Median (4.70)***
Debt/Common Equity, % Average 148.68 108.81 71
Median 107.33 71.54
St. deviation 178.61 112.73
T-value for difference Average (1.88)*
Median (1.69)*
EBIT/Interest expense Average 10.03 12.35 71
Median 3.02 5.64
St. deviation 37.20 21.91
T-value for difference Average (0.53)
Median (0.59)
Net Margin Average 5.48 3.42 71
Median 3.51 3.63
St. deviation 9.71 23.97
T-value for difference Average (1.79)*
Median (0.10)
Gross Profit Margin Average 25.70 28.28 69
Median 26.36 26.44
St. deviation 19.87 19.30
T-value for difference Average (1.08)
Median (0.04)
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively
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Fixed Charges Coverage = Earnings before Interest and Taxes / (Interest Expense on Debt + (Preferred 
Dividends (Cash)) / 1- (Tax Rate /100))
Debt/Total Assets = (Short Term Debt & Current Portion of Long Term Debt + Long Term Debt) / Total Assets 
* 100
Debt/Common Equity = (Long Term Debt + Short Term Debt & Current Portion of Long Term Debt) / 
Common Equity * 100
EBIT/Interest Expense = Earnings before interest and taxes / total interest expense.
Net Margin = Net Income before Preferred Dividends / Net Sales or Revenues * 100 
Gross Profit Margin = Gross Income / Net Sales or Revenues * 100
Table 11 shows that the pre-carve-out parent companies seem to be more leveraged than their 
industry peers. Parent firms’ debt/total assets average ratio is 30.23 % (median 33.06 %), 
compared to the average of 27.35 % (median 24.37 %) for industry peers. The difference in 
the ratios between parent firms and industry rivals is thus 2.88 and 8.69 percentage points, 
respectively. Debt/common equity is also greater than with industry peers, average ratio being 
148.68 % (median 107.33 %), compared to industry average of 108.81 % (median 71.54 %). 
The difference in the average ratio is 39.87 percentage points and in the median ratio 35.79 
percentage points. Parent companies’ fixed charges coverage average ratio is insignificantly 
higher than industry peers’, 10.18 compared to 9.17. The median number is clearly lower 
though, 3.04 compared to 5.30, the difference being 2.26 (-42.6 %).
The median numbers are probably more reliable indicators with measures like this, since the 
accounting variables are most likely not normally distributed. The median values thus count 
out the effect of extreme numbers. It can be seen from table 11 that the difference in median 
debt/total assets ratio is statistically significant at the 1 % level, and that the average and 
median differences in debt/common equity ratio are both statistically significant at the 10 % 
level. Other differences are not statistically significant.
All this evidence suggests that parent companies might use equity carve-outs as a means to 
improve their balance sheet. The results thus provide evidence for hypothesis 7, which states 
that parent companies conducting equity carve-outs are more leveraged than on average. 
However, the possibility that the primary reason for equity carve-outs is for example 
refocusing or better stand-alone value for the carved-out subsidiary cannot be counted out, 
since the parent firms might choose an equity carve-out over a spin-off to ‘kill two birds with 
one stone’. My results are in line with those obtained earlier by Allen and McConnell (1998): 
they find that parent firms in their sample have significantly lower interest coverage ratios and 
higher debt ratios that industry rivals before initiating equity carve-outs.
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The results about parent companies’ operating performance do not give a clear indication of 
either worse or better performance than rivals’. Parent companies’ net margin average is 
higher than industry peers’, 5.48 % vs. 3.42 %, but median values are approximately similar 
(3.51 % vs. 3.63 %). The differences thus are 2.06 and -0.12 percentage points, respectively. 
It should be noted that the standard deviation in this ratio is clearly higher for industry peers, 
and therefore the median number probably gives a better picture of their operating 
performance. Gross profit margin average is somewhat lower for parent firms than for 
industry peers, 25.70 % compared to 28.28 %, with a —2.58 percentage points difference. The 
median numbers are approximately equal, 26.36 % for parent firms vs. 26.44 % for industry 
peers, the difference being a negligible -0.08 percentage points. Only the average difference 
in net margin is statically significant, at the 10 % level.
All this evidence indicates that pre-carve-out parent firms’ operating performance does not 
differ significantly from industry peers’. Although parent firms are more leveraged than 
rivals, they are able to maintain operating performance levels similar to rivals’. These results 
do not support hypothesis 8, which states that parent companies conducting equity carve-outs 
exhibit poor operating performance before the carve-out. These results differ from those 
obtained earlier by Allen and McConnell (1998), who find that pre-carve-out parent firms 
have lower profit margins on sales and lower rates of return on assets than industry peers. 
Thus, European companies conducting equity carve-outs seem to perform relatively better 
compared to their US counterparts.
5.5. Operating Performance of post-Carve-Out Parent Firms
The purpose of measuring the operating performance of both the parent and the subsidiary 
firms is to test whether equity carve-outs create more competitive parent and subsidiary, as 
implied by the divestiture gains hypothesis. First, the scale of operations is analysed and then 
the efficiency of operations.
Table 12 presents sales, income, total assets and capital expenditure growth over the period 
(0,1) years from the equity carve-out year for parent firms and their industry peers. Industry 
peers are a group of 1 to 5 companies with the same SIC code as parents, and whose sales are 
within 5 (or 10, if not enough peer data available) companies above or below the parent. They
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are obtained from Thomson One Banker. For some companies, there is no peer group data 
available to calculate the different growth rates, and therefore the number of companies varies 
within the ratios.
Table 12
This table shows mean and median sales, income, total assets and capital expenditure growth rates 
over event years (0, +1) from the carve-out year for parent firms and industry peers. The first row 
shows the mean and the second row the median value. T-values for difference are in parentheses. 
Industry peers are a group of 1 to 5 companies with the same SIC-code than the sample companies. 







Sales Average 27.09% 21.67% 79
Median 8.38% 14.09%
T-value for difference Average (0.40)
Median (0.42)
Income Average -13.14% 55.81% 74
Median -8.84% 28.62%
T-value for difference Average (113)
Median (0.62)
Total assets Average 43.28% 19.10% 77
Median 3.68% 11.42%
T-value for difference Average (112)
Median (0.36)
Capital expenditures Average 16.92% 40.48% 65
Median 3.28% 16.61%
T-value for difference Average (2.75)**
Median (1.56)
* and ** denote significance at 5 % and 1 % level, respectively
Parent firms seem to have higher average growth rates than peers in sales and total assets; 
income and capital expenditures average growth is inferior to peers. The average growth rate 
of sales is 27.09 %, compared to 19.10 % for peers, and the average total assets growth for 
parents is 43.28 %, compared to 37.1 % for the peer group. As for income growth, the average
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for parent firms is -13.40 %, vs. 55.81 % for rivals, and the capital expenditure average 
growth is 16.92 % vs. 40.48 % for rivals. Median values on the other hand are inferior to 
industry rivals in all the ratios; sales, total assets, income and capital expenditures growth. 
Median sales growth rate for parents is 8.38 % (vs. industry 14.09 %), income growth rate is - 
8.84 % (vs. 28.62 %), total assets growth rate is 3.68 % (vs. 11.42 %), and capital expenditure 
growth rate is 3.28 % (vs. 16.61 %). Again median growth rates might be more reliable for 
these kinds of measures for reasons discussed above.
These results suggest that equity carve-outs do not create more competitive parent firms at 
least when measured by the scale of operations; instead, parent firms’ growth rates seem to be 
lower that their industry peers’ following the carve-out. However, only the difference in 
average capital expenditure growth is statistically significant (at the 5 % level). Lack of 
statistical significance is likely to be due to the relative high standard deviations of all the 
growth rates. These results are partly in line with those obtained earlier by Hulburt, Miles and 
Woolridge (2003): they report negative size- and industry-matched sales, income, total assets 
and capital expenditure growth rates for their sample companies, but positive performance- 
adjusted growth rates. The results do not support hypothesis 9, which states that equity carve- 
outs result in higher growth rates for parent companies.
In addition to growth rates, I have calculated the change in different kinds of profitability 
measures for parent firms and their industry peers after the equity carve-out. Improvements in 
profitability may be considered as more important proofs of the divestiture gains hypothesis 
than accounting variable growth rates, since restructuring by equity carve-outs is supposed to 
be done to produce more efficient parent company operations, not merely to increase the scale 
of operations. Table 13 presents changes in operating performance measures, ROA, ROE and 
ROIC over the period (0,1 ) from the carve-out year. The peer group is the same as in table 11. 
Number of companies again varies depending on data availability.
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Table 13
This table shows mean and median changes in operating performance measures, ROA, ROE and 
ROIC, over the event years (0, +1) for parent firms and industry peers. First row shows the mean and 
the second row the median value. T-values for differences are in parentheses. Definitions of ratios are 
found below the table. Industry peers are a group of 1 to 5 companies with the same SIC-code than the 








































*, ** and *** denote significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively
ROA = Net Income before Preferred Dividends + ((Interest Expense on Debt-Interest Capitalized) * (1-Tax 
Rate))) / Last Year’s Total Assets * 100
ROE = (Income before Preferred Dividends - Preferred Dividends) / Total Common Equity * 100
ROIC = (Net Income before Preferred Dividends + ((Interest Expense on Debt - Interest Capitalized) * (1-Tax
Rate))) / (Last Year's Total Capital + Last Year's Short Term Debt & Current Portion of Long Term Debt) * 100
If measured by the average change, parent companies seem to underperform their industry 
peers in ROA and ROIC change; only ROE change is better. The average change in ROA for 
parents is-17.66 %, in ROE -9.39 % and in ROIC -28.52 %, versus 11.55 %, -25.47 % and - 
2.31 % for peers, respectively. If measured by the median number, parent firms now seem to 
underperform their industry peers in all the operating performance measures. Median value 
for ROA change is -1.94 % for parents, compared to 1.15 % for peers, for ROE change -9.02 
% (vs. 4.02 %), and for ROIC change 6.60 % (vs. -0.40 %). All this evidence implies that
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equity carve-outs do not increase parent firm profitability relative to industry peers. 
Consequently, the results do not support hypothesis 10 that assumes operating performance 
improvements for parent companies as a result of equity carve-out. However, none of the 
differences in average and median values are statistically significant, again most likely due to 
the relative high standard deviations of the measures. Despite the lack of statistical 
significance, the results can be considered as giving some guidance about parent firms’ post­
carve-out operating performance.
These results contradict the findings of Slovin, Sushka and Ferraro (1995), who find negative 
abnormal returns for US parent firm rivals at the announcement of an equity carve-out. If an 
equity carve-out leads to a more efficient and profitable parent firm, rivals’ stock price 
reaction should be negative, as it was in the case of Slovin et al. It might be an interesting 
research topic to study the effect of European equity carve-outs announcements on the parent 
firm rivals’ stock price, since in light of this evidence the effect should rather be positive or 
neutral instead of negative. My results are neither in line with Hulburt, Miles and Woolridge 
(2003), who find profitability improvements for parent companies conducting equity carve- 
outs with their US sample.
The analysis of post-carve-out parent firm performance altogether does not provide evidence 
in favour of the divestiture gains hypothesis; rather, it more or less supports the asymmetric 
information hypothesis. Parent firms seem to be less profitable than peers following the equity 
carve-out, and their scale of operations does not seem to increase. However, to make any 
reliable conclusions about the reasons of equity carve-outs, subsidiary firms’ operating 
performance must also be studied. If asymmetric information is present, the performance of 
subsidiaries should worsen after the equity carve-out since the management is assumed to sell 
overvalued subsidiary equity in the carve-out. Next, the operating performance of post-carve- 
out subsidiary firms is analysed to shed more light on the effects of carve-outs to both of the 
involved companies.
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5.6. Operating Performance of post-Carve-Out Subsidiary Firms
As with parent firms, the scale of operations and the efficiency of operations are both 
analysed within the context of equity carve-out subsidiary firms. The measures and ratios 
used are the same as with parent firms. Table 14 presents changes in sales, income, total 
assets and capital expenditure for subsidiary firms and their industry peers over the event 
years (0,+1), or if data not available, over the event years (+l,+2) from the carve-out. The 
peer group is defined as a group of 1 to 5 companies with the same SIC code as subsidiaries, 
and whose sales are within 5 (or 10, if not enough peer data available) companies above or 
below the subsidiary.
Table 14
This table shows mean and median sales, income, total assets and capital expenditure growth rates 
over event years (0, +1), or if not available over (+l,+2) from the carve-out year for subsidiary firms 
and industry peers. The first row shows the mean and the second row the median value. T-values for 
differences are in parentheses. Industry peers are a group of 1 to 5 companies with the same SIC-code 



















































*, ** and *** denote significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively
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It can be seen from table 14 that the subsidiary firms have higher average sales growth rate 
than industry peers, but income, total assets and capital expenditure average growth rates are 
lower. The average sales growth for subsidiaries is 50.20 %, vs. 28.85 % for peers. The 
average income growth is 57.58 %, vs. 88.10 %, the average total assets growth is 23.25 %, 
vs. 37.90 %, and the average capital expenditures growth rate is 88.53 %, vs. 176.49 % for 
rivals. However, if measured by median growth, the subsidiaries outperform their industry 
peers in all but one of the measures. Median sales, income and total assets growth rates are 
superior to peers; only capital expenditures growth is inferior. As discussed earlier with parent 
firms, median values are probably more reliable with measures like this. The median sales 
growth for subsidiaries is 15.70 %, vs. 11.06 % for industry peers, and the median income 
growth is 27.25 %, vs. 20.43 %. The median total assets growth is 9.57 %, vs. 7.45 %, and 
finally, the median capital expenditures growth is 28.11 %, vs. 40.65 %. The average 
differences in total assets and capital expenditure growth are statistically significant at the 5 % 
and 1 % level, respectively. Other differences are not statistically significant.
Based on this analysis, equity carve-outs seem to produce more competitive subsidiary firms, 
at least when measured by the scale of operations. The subsidiaries outperform their industry 
peers in median sales, income and total assets growth. Anyhow, it seems that subsidiary 
firms’ investments (as measured by capital expenditure growth) are inferior to peers, at least 
immediately following the carve-out. It could be that the subsidiaries concentrate on 
improving their existing operations before expanding. This could be an interesting future 
research topic; to analyse the operating performance of European equity carve-out subsidiary 
firms with a longer time horizon as it has been done with US companies by i.e. Powers 
(2003). These results support hypothesis 8, which predicts higher growth rates for subsidiary 
companies as a result of an equity carve-out, although without statistical significance.
Next, the change in the efficiency of operations following the equity carve-out is analysed. 
Table 15 presents changes in operating performance measures, ROA, ROE and ROIC, for 
subsidiary firms and their industry peers over the years (0,+l), or if data not available over 
(+l,+2) from the carve-out year. The peer group is the same as table 14.
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Table 15
This table shows mean and median changes in operating performance over the event years (0, +1), or 
if data not available for (+l,+2) from the carve-out year for subsidiary firms and industry peers. First 
row shows the mean and the second row the median value. T-values for differences are in parentheses. 
Definitions of ratios are found below the table. Industry peers are a group of 1 to 5 companies with the 








































*, ** and *** denote significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively
ROA = Net Income before Preferred Dividends + ((Interest Expense on Debt-Interest Capitalized) * (1-Tax 
Rate))) / Last Year’s Total Assets * 100
ROE = (Income before Preferred Dividends - Preferred Dividends) / Total Common Equity * 100
ROIC = (Net Income before Preferred Dividends + ((Interest Expense on Debt - Interest Capitalized) * (1-Tax
Rate))) / (Last Year's Total Capital + Last Year’s Short Term Debt & Current Portion of Long Term Debt) * 100
Table 15 shows that the subsidiary firms have higher average growth rates in ROA and ROIC 
after the carve-out; only ROE change is inferior to peers. The average change in ROA is 0.17 
% for subsidiaries, compared to -186.49 % for peers, and the average change in ROIC is 
33.48 %, vs. -80.36 % for peers. The average change in ROE is -310.76 %, vs. -73.88. Such 
large changes are most likely caused by some extreme values in the sample, and therefore the 
median values are probably more reliable. When measured by the median change, subsidiary 
firms seem to outperform their peers in all the ratios used. The median change in ROA for
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subsidiaries is 1.57 %, vs. -0.66 % for peers, the median change in ROE is -0.21 %, vs. -3.34 
% and the median change in ROIC is -0.84 %, vs. -5.68 %. Thus, these results provide 
support for hypothesis 9, which assumes operating performance improvements for carved-out 
subsidiary companies. Average differences in ROA and ROIC change are both statistically 
significant at 1 % level, but other differences lack statistical significance.
These results altogether suggest that equity carve-out do produce more competitive subsidiary 
companies, measured both by the scale of operations and the efficiency of operations. The 
results support the divestiture gains hypothesis, especially the refocusing and the complexity, 
undervaluation and pure play sub-hypotheses. The results are in contrast to the asymmetric 
information hypothesis that predicts no efficiency improvements as a result of an equity 
carve-out. Earlier, Hulburt, Miles and Woolridge (2003) have obtained similar results for their 
sample subsidiary firms: both scale and efficiency of operations improved following the 
equity carve-out.
5.7. Regression Analysis
I conclude my analysis about equity carve-out motives and effects by conducting a regression 
analysis to further test the effects of certain parent and subsidiary company features on the 
magnitude of the observed abnormal returns. For some companies, there was no data 
available for all the explanatory variables and therefore they had to be excluded from the 
regression. The regression sample size is 80. The results of the regression are presented in 
table 16. Table 17 presents the correlation between the explanatory variables.
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Table 16
This table presents the results of my regression analysis. The dependent variable is announcement-day 
abnormal return. Definitions of the explanatory variables are found below the table. Sample size is 80 
parent companies.
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value
Intercept 0,0142 0,015 0,96 0,34
Gamma 1 0,0000 0,000 -1,37 0,18
Different-industry dummy 0,0141 0,011 1,29 0,20
Financing dummy -0,0137 0,012 -1,18 0,24
Investing dummy -0,0102 0,011 -0,93 0,36
Debt/Total Assets 0,0003 0,000 0,98 0,33
ROA -0,0007 0,000 -1,49 0,14
Gamma = The ratio of non-subsidiary equity to subsidiary equity (gamma 1)
Industry = A dummy taking the value 1 if the parent and subsidiary have a different 2-digit SIC-code, and 0 if 
not
Investing = A dummy taking the value 1 if investing-hypothesis types of reasons are mentioned in the news 
reports
Financing = A dummy taking the value 1 if financing-hypothesis types of reasons are mentioned in the news 
reports
Leverage = The ratio of debt/total assets of the pre-carve-out parent firm 
ROA = Return on assets of the parent firm in the year if the carve-out.
Table 17




industry Financing Investing Debt/Total Assets ROA
Gamma 1 1
Different-industry 0,08 1,00
Financing 0,11 0,08 1,00
Investing 0,01 -0,01 -0,04 1,00
Debt/Total Assets -0,04 -0,11 0,03 -0,02 1,00
ROA -0,02 -0,06 -0,07 0,10 -0,14 1,00
The regression results produce the following equation:
CARann i = 0.0142 + O.OGAMMAi + 0.0141INDUSTRY, - 0.0102INVESTING, 
- 0.0137FINANCING; + 0.0003LEVERAGE¡ - 0.0007ROA¡ + p, (5)
It can be seen from the regression results that the different-industry dummy has the greatest 
effect on the magnitude of abnormal returns. The different-industry coefficient is positive 
with a value of 0.0141. The different-industry effect has been detected in previous studies as 
well: Vijh (2002) finds a statistically significant negative coefficient for his same-industry
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dummy and similarly, Allen and McConnell find a negative although not statistically 
significant coefficient for their same-industry dummy (in both Vijh and Allen et al. the 
dummy has a value of 1 if the companies have the same SIC code and 0 otherwise). Also 
Rejman (2004) in his Master’s Thesis finds that cross-industry carve-outs affect the 
magnitude of excess returns positively.
The second largest effect seems to be caused by the financing dummy. Its coefficient is 
negative with a value of-0.0137. The investing dummy seems to have the third largest effect, 
with also a negative coefficient of-0.0102. These findings contradict those of Vijh (2002) and 
Allen and McConnell (1998). Vijh finds that financing and investing types of reasons behind 
carve-outs affect the abnormal returns positively (although only the investing coefficient is 
statistically significant). Allen and McConnell find a positive, statistically significant 
coefficient for their use of proceeds dummy (1 if funds are paid out, 0 otherwise). Their use of 
proceeds -dummy is not exactly the same as my investing and financing dummies, but 
anyhow its coefficient does give some indication of the market reaction. However, Rejman 
(2004) finds that financing as a motive for carve-outs has a negative and statistically 
significant impact on the excess returns, with a global equity carve-out dataset.
The other coefficients are economically less significant, and what is notable, the coefficient of 
gamma is practically zero. This is in contrast to the asymmetric information hypothesis that 
predicts increasing abnormal returns as the value of gamma increases, which should be 
implied by a positive gamma coefficient. These results suggest that the relative size of parent 
and subsidiary companies does not affect the abnormal returns related to the announcement of 
an equity carve-out. Previous research by Vijh (2002) and Allen and McConnell (1998) has 
found positive statistically significant coefficients for relative size measures opposite to 
gamma (i.e. ratio of subsidiary assets to non-subsidiary assets), which means that the 
abnormal returns in their samples decrease with as gamma increases. This kind of behaviour 
is not detected in my regression analysis, since the relative size of parent and subsidiary 
companies does not seem to affect the magnitude of abnormal return at all.
Also the leverage and ROA coefficients are insignificant in size; 0.0003 and -0.0007, 
respectively. Thus the financial condition and operating performance of the parent firm do not 
seem to affect the magnitude of the observed abnormal returns. Allen and McConnell (1998)
53
find a negative but statistically insignificant coefficient for their leverage measure, and a 
positive but again statistically insignificant return on assets coefficient.
It should be noted that none of the regression coefficients are statistically significant and 
therefore no reliable scientific conclusions can be drawn from the analysis. T-values of the 
different-industry, financing and investing dummies are 1.29, -1.18 and -0.93, respectively. 
Also, R-2 is only 0.114 and the F-statistic 1.565, so the model does not seem to detect all the 
variables affecting the magnitude of excess returns. From table 17 it can be seen that there is 
no high correlation between the explanatory variables, so the model at least does not seem to 
suffer from multicollinearity.
The regression results, although not statistically significant, do not provide evidence in 
support of the asymmetric information hypothesis. Rather, the positive effect of the different- 
industry dummy supports the refocusing sub-hypothesis of the divestiture gains hypothesis. 
The negative signs of the financing and investing coefficients on the other hand are against 
the financing and investing sub-hypotheses’ predictions of a positive effect of paying down 
debt or funding new investments on the abnormal returns related to equity carve-out 
announcements. Perhaps the market reacts differently to European equity carve-out 
announcements that to US announcements; carve-outs that are used in purpose of raising 
equity capital are not seen as favourable as those conducted mainly to increase focus. 
However, this is just speculation and overall, the regression results are mixed and lack 
statistical significance.
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6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this study is to provide a comprehensive analysis of equity carve-outs 
conducted by European companies, using a set of 94 carve-outs announced between 1991 and 
2005. Four different angles are discussed: market reaction to equity carve-out announcements, 
motivation behind carve-outs stated by firm managers and the business community, financial 
characteristics of firms conducting carve-outs, and operating performance of post-carve-out 
parent and subsidiary firms. As there are no previous equity carve-out studies including a pan- 
European dataset, this study sheds light on the reasons for European companies to conduct 
equity carve-outs, and contributes to the existing discussion about the sources of wealth gain 
related to them.
Equity carve-outs started to gain popularity in Europe in the beginning of the 1990s. In US, 
they have been used as a divestiture method a considerably larger period, and consequently 
there are several studies about equity carve-outs with US data. Equity carve-outs are the only 
form of equity financing associated with a positive stock market reaction, in contrast to 
seasoned equity offerings (for SEO announcement stock market effect, see for example 
Masulis and Konwar (1998)). That makes them an interesting study topic. There are two 
competing hypotheses about the sources of the well-documented wealth gain: the asymmetric 
information hypothesis and the divestiture gains hypothesis. The asymmetric information 
hypothesis sees equity carve-outs as financing instruments, selling overvalued subsidiary 
equity, whereas the divestiture gains hypothesis states that carve-outs result in efficiency 
improvements in the companies involved.
I find statistically significant abnormal returns for my sample parent companies announcing 
equity carve-outs. The announcement-day excess return equals 1.61 %, the announcement- 
period -1, +1 days excess return equals 1.60 %, and the announcement-period -5, +5 days 
excess return equals 2.31 %. This is in line with previous US studies, and it thus seems that 
European companies announcing equity carve-outs experience wealth gains similar to their 
US counterparts. The abnormal returns start to accumulate approximately ten days before the 
announcement, which implies that the market may anticipate it.
I analyse the motives for companies to conduct equity carve-outs by studying news reports 
and press releases related to them. I was able to find a meaningful news report for 82 of my
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sample carve-outs through a keyword search in LexisNexis database. I group the different 
reasons mentioned into two board hypotheses: the asymmetric information and the divestiture 
gain hypotheses. Moreover, the divestitures gain hypothesis is divided into several sub­
hypotheses that are all related to more efficient operations resulting from a carve-out. The 
sub-hypotheses are: refocusing (carve-outs are a means of achieving greater focus), financing 
(carve-outs are conducted to raise equity capital to pay down debt), investing (carve-outs are 
conducted to raise equity capital for investments), complexity, undervaluation and pure play 
(carve-outs create better stand-alone value for the subsidiary), and managerial incentives 
(carve-outs are conducted to motivate subsidiary managers through stock-based 
compensation).
I find little evidence supporting the asymmetric information hypothesis. Overvalued 
subsidiary equity is mentioned only in 10 cases, or 12.2 % of the total sample. Investing, 
financing and refocusing types of reasons dominate the discussion; they are mentioned 77 
times altogether. Investment motives are the most common (36.6 %), followed by financing 
(32.9 %) and refocusing (24.4%). It thus seems that European companies do not conduct 
equity carve-outs to take advantage of overvalued subsidiary equity, but in order to achieve 
divestiture gains.
I extend the analysis of equity carve-out motives by studying the financial characteristics of 
firms initiating carve-outs. I calculate several measures of leverage and operating 
performance for my sample parent companies, and find that they are more leveraged than 
industry peers before the carve-out. Parent companies have statistically significant higher 
median debt/total assets and debt/common equity ratios than their industry rivals. However, 
parent companies’ operating performance does not differ significantly from industry peers. It 
thus seems that despite higher leverage, equity carve-out parent companies are able to 
maintain operating performance levels similar to their rivals. This evidence suggests that 
firms may conduct equity carve-outs to improve their balance sheet.
I measure the operating performance of both the parent and subsidiary firms after the carve- 
out in order to see whether equity carve-outs produce more competitive parent and subsidiary, 
as implied by the divestiture gains hypothesis. If carve-outs are mainly financing instruments 
as stated by the asymmetric information hypothesis, then they should not affect the operating 
performance of the companies involved. Both the scale and efficiency of operations are
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analysed, and the results are mixed. Parent companies have lower median sales, income, total 
assets and capital expenditure growth rates than industry peers following the carve-out, and 
their operating performance is also worse than rivals’. On the other hand, subsidiary 
companies have higher median sales, income and total asset growth rates than industry peers, 
and their median operating performance measures are also better. This evidence suggests that 
equity carve-outs do produce more competitive subsidiary firms, but parent companies’ 
operating performance does not seem to improve. It should be noted however that most of the 
numbers lack statistical significance.
I also conduct a regression analysis to further test the effect of certain parent and subsidiary 
company features and carve-out motives on the magnitude of the observed abnormal returns. 
Although the results lack statistical significance, some remarks can be made. Based on the 
regression coefficients, cross-industry carve-outs have a positive impact on the excess returns. 
This supports the refocusing sub-hypothesis of the divestiture gains hypothesis. Financing and 
investing motives have a negative effect on the abnormal returns, and it thus seems that the 
market does not appreciate the use of equity carve-outs as a means of repaying debt or 
funding investments over other motives. Other coefficients are insignificant in size.
Table 18 on the next page presents a summary of my research hypotheses and evidence 
supporting them. The hypotheses are presented in more detail in section 3.
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Table 18
This table presents a summary of the research hypotheses and evidence found to support them.
Hypothesis Evidence supporting the hypothesis?
/77: Asymmetric information
Carve-outs are used as financing instruments
to sell overvalued subsidiary equity
No; the magnitude of gamma (non-subsidiary 
assets/subsidiary assets) does not affect 
the magnitude of excess returns. Asymmetric 
information as a reason for carve-out mentioned 
only for 12 % of sample companies.
/72: Refocusing
Carve-outs are conducted to achieve greater 
focus
Yes; cross-industry carve-outs affect the 
magnitude of excess returns positively. 
Refocusing as a reason for carve-out mentioned 
for 24 % of sample companies.
/73: Financing
Carve-outs are used to raise equity capital 
for debt repayment or other financial obligations
Yes; financing as a reason for carve-outs 
mentioned for 33 % of sample companies. 
Parent companies have high leverage ratios 
before the carve-out.
/74: Investing
Carve-outs are used to raise equity capital 
for investments
Yes; investing is the most commonly stated 
motive for carve-outs (37 %)
/75: Complexity, undervaluation and pure play 
Carve-outs are conducted to achieve better 
stand-alone value for the subsidiary
Little; better stand-alone value for subsidiary 
mentioned only for 17 % of sample companies, 
but cross-industry carve-outs affect the magnitude 
of excess returns positively.
/76: Managerial incentives
Carve-outs are used to motivate subsidiary
mangers through better stock-based compensation
No; mentioned only for 3 % of sample companies.
/77: Leverage
Parent companies that conduct carve-outs are 
more leveraged than industry rivals
Yes; parent companies have higher leverage 
ratios than industry peers before the carve-outs 
(statistically significant differences in mean ratios).
/78: Operating performance
Parent companies that conduct carve-outs exhibit
poor operating performance compared to industry rivals
No; no difference in the operating performance of 
pre-carve-out parents and industry rivals.
/79: Scale of operations
Carve-outs result in higher accounting variable growth 
rates for parents and subsidiaries than industry rivals
No for parent firms, yes for subsidiary firms. 
Parent companies underperform and subsidiaries 
outperform industry rivals after the carve-out 
(however, no statistical significance)
H10: Efficiency of operations
Carve-outs result in more efficient operation for parents 
and subsidiaries than industry rivals
No for parent firms, yes for subsidiary firms. 
Parent companies underperform and subsidiaries 
outperform industry rivals after the carve-out 
(however, no statistical significance)
Based on this analysis, European companies conduct equity carve-outs mainly to achieve 
greater focus and to raise equity capital for debt repayment and investments. Consequently, 
the answer to the question if European equity carve-outs are good or evil is that they are good. 
Companies do not seem to be selling overvalued subsidiary equity to investors, as manifested 
by the good operating performance of the carved-out subsidiaries after the event. Still, parent 
companies exhibit poor operating performance after the carve-out. Therefore it seems that
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European carve-outs produce only more competitive subsidiary companies, not parents. An 
interesting future research topic could be an analysis of the operating performance of the 
subsidiaries in the long-term, to see if they are able to outperform their rivals on a longer time 
horizon. It might also be of interest to study the occurrence of second events, that is spin-offs 
or re-acquisitions of subsidiary, in Europe. Studying the stock market reaction of parent 
companies’ rivals within the announcement of carve-outs might also provide more evidence 
on the sources of the observed wealth gains.
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APPENDIX: Companies announcing equity carve-outs and announcement dates
Company Announcement date
Adía SA 1.8.1995





В raneóte Holdings PLC 4.1.2001
Bure Equity AB 22.11.2000
Canal Plus SA 19.2.2000




Credit Suisse Group 5.5.2004
Cremonini SpA 18.2.2005
Deutsche Bank 1.10.2000












France Telecom SA 2.3.2000
France Telecom SA 8.1.2001
France Telecom SA 22.6.2004




Helsinki Telephone Pic 20.11.1999











Midway Holding AB 27.8.1993
MobilCom AG 6.11.1999
Nestle SA 22.2.2002
Novo Nordisk A/S 17.10.2000
NV Koninklijke KNP ВТ 11.5.1995
OTE - Hellenic Telecommunications Organisation 7.8.2000
Outokumpu Oyj 5.4.1993
Pearson PLC 27.7.1993
Peninsular & Oriental Steam 26.3.1996





Roche Holdings AG 14.6.1999







Stolt Tankers & Terminals SA 15.3.1993
Svedala Industri AB 22.4.1994
Tabacalera 3.9.1998
Tarmac PLC 1.11.1993











United Internet AG 25.4.2000
Wassail PLC 10.3.1997
Veba Kraftwerke Ruhr AG 18.5.1995
Veba Kraftwerke Ruhr AG 26.9.1999
Willis Corroon Group PLC 24.9.1993
Vivendi SA 25.2.2000
Zurich Financial Services AG 7.10.1999
Zurich Financial Services AG 6.9.2001
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Company Announcement date
Zurich Insurance Со. 10.3.1993
3i Group PLC 1.6.1998
3i Group PLC 18.2.2002
3i Group PLC 16.6.2004
